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ABSTRACT
LISE is a multidisciplinary project involving lawyers and
computer scientists with the aim to put forward a set of
methods and tools to (1) define software liability in a precise
and unambiguous way and (2) establish such liability in case
of incident. This paper provides an overview of the overall
approach taken in the project based on a case study. The
case study illustrates a situation where, in order to reduce
legal uncertainties, the parties to a contract wish to include
in the agreement specific clauses to define as precisely as
possible the share of liabilities between them for the main
types of failures of the system.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Software contracts usually include strong liability limita-
tions or even exemptions of the providers for damages caused
by their products. This situation does not favour the devel-
opment of high quality software because the software indus-
try does not have sufficient economical incentives to apply
stringent development and verification methods. Indeed, ex-
perience shows that products tend to be higher quality and
more secure when the actors in position to influence their de-
velopment are also the actors bearing the liability for their
defects [2, 5, 27]. The usual argument to justify this lack of
liability is the fact that software products are too complex
and versatile objects whose expected features (and poten-
tial defects) cannot be characterised precisely, and which
thus cannot be treated as traditional (tangible) goods. Ad-
mittedly, this argument is not without any ground: it is well
known that defining in an unambiguous, comprehensive and
understandable way the expected behaviour of systems in-
tegrating a variety of components is quite a challenge, not
to mention the use of such definition as a basis for a liability
agreement. Taking up this challenge is precisely the objec-
tive of the LISE project: the project studies liability issues
both from the legal and the technical points of view with
the aim to put forward a formal framework to (1) define li-
ability in a precise and unambiguous way and (2) establish
such liability in case of incident.
Obviously, specifying all liabilities in a formal framework
is neither possible nor desirable. Usually, the parties wish to
express as precisely as possible certain aspects which are of
prime importance for them and prefer to state other aspects
less precisely (either because it is impossible to foresee at
contracting time all the events that may occur or because
they do not want to be bound by too precise commitments).
Taking this requirement into account, LISE provides a set of
tools and methods to be used on a need basis in the contract
drafting process (as opposed to a monolithic, “all or nothing”
approach).
The objective of this paper is to provide an overview of
the overall approach taken in LISE. The presentation is
based on a case study: an electronic signature application
installed on a mobile phone. Needless to say, we do not
intend to illustrate all the aspects of the approach or to
describe the general framework through this case study. Our
aim is rather to provide some hints on the notion of liability
considered in LISE and the potential use of the results of
the project in a concrete situation.
The structure of the paper reflects the chronological or-
dering of the actions in a real case: Section 2 describes the
starting point (IT system subject to the agreement, parties
involved, informal agreement between the parties and legal
context); Section 3 presents the formal definition of liabil-
ities; Section 4 suggests how the formal definition is used
to instrument the system with appropriate logging facilities
and to design a log analyser. Finally, Section 5 provides a
sketch of related work and Section 6 identifies avenues for
further research.
2. STARTING POINT
We consider an electronic signature system allowing an e-
commerce company to send a document to be signed by an
individual on his mobile phone. The signature of the doc-
ument is subject to the individual’s approval (and authen-
tication) and all communications and signature operations
are performed trough his mobile phone. In a real situation,
the activation of the signature system would be preceded by
a request from the individual or by a negotiation with the e-
commerce company, but we do not consider this negotiation
phase here.
The mobile phone itself incorporates a smart card (for
the verification of the PIN) and a signature application. We
assume that the mobile phone provider, the signature appli-
cation provider and the smart card provider want to execute
an agreement to put such a mobile phone signature solution
on the market. In order to reduce legal uncertainties, the
parties wish to include in the agreement specific provisions
to define as precisely as possible the share of liabilities be-
tween them for the main types of failures of the system.1
Their intention is to use these provisions to settle liability
issues in an amicable way by the application of well-defined
rules. At this stage it may be the case that all the compo-
nents (software and hardware) are already available and the
only remaining task is their integration. It may also be the
case that some or all the components still have to be devel-
oped. In general, no assumption can thus be made on the
fact that software components can be designed or modified
in a specific way to make the implementation of liabilities
easier. The only assumptions made at this stage are:
• On the technical side: the availability of the func-
tional architecture of the system (interfaces of the com-
ponents and informal definition of their expected be-
haviour).
• On the business side: an informal agreement between
the parties with respect to the share of liabilities.
The objective of the infrastructure described in this paper
is to allow the parties to translate this informal agreement
into a contract which is both valid in the legal sense and as
precise as possible, in particular w.r.t. technical issues, in
order to minimise legal uncertainties. In the remainder of
this section, we describe the initial technical and legal situ-
ation: the IT system itself (Section 2.1), the actors involved
(Section 2.2), the informal agreement between the parties
signing the agreement (Section 2.3) and the legal context
surrounding the agreement (Section 2.4).
1We do not consider infringement or any other liabilities
related to intellectual property rights here.
2.1 IT System
At the start of the contractual phase, the IT system is
usually defined in an informal way by its architecture: its
components, their interfaces, expected behaviours and in-
teractions. In our case study, we assume that the electronic
signature system is made of the following components:
• A Server (Serv).
• A Signature Application (SigApp).
• A Smart Card (Card).
• A Mobile Input/Output (IO) component which gath-
ers the keyboard and the display of the mobile phone
(including their drivers).
• An Operating System (OpSys).
All the components except Serv are embedded in the mobile
phone. In this paper, we focus on liabilities related to the
mobile phone system and do not consider liabilities related
to Serv or the communication network.2 The only function-
ality of OpSys that we consider here is its role of medium for
all communications between the mobile phone components
(i.e. between SigApp, Card and IO).
The architecture of the system and its information flows
are pictured in Figure 1. The protocol starts with the E-
Commerce Company (ECC ) requesting a signature for doc-
ument D (message 1). The document is forwarded by Serv
and SigApp, and presented to Customer (OWN ) by IO
(messages 2, 3 and 4). If OWN refuses to sign, ECC is
informed through IO , SigApp and Serv (messages 5-n, 6-n,
7-n and 8-n). If OWN agrees, the document and the PIN
code entered by OWN are forwarded to Card by SigApp
(messages 5-y, 6-y and 7-y). Next, depending on whether
Card authenticates the PIN code or not, the document and
the signature produced by Card are sent to ECC via SigApp
and Serv (messages 8-y-r, 9-y-r and 10-y-r), or ECC is in-
formed via SigApp and Serv of the authentication failure
(messages 8-y-w, 9-y-w and 10-y-w).
The implementation of the embedded components of the
signature system, which is further detailed in Section 4.1,
is based on OSGi, an interoperable environment for small
devices such as home gateways, car embedded systems and
mobile phones.3
2.2 Actors
We assume that the contract is to be executed by the three
parties involved in the manufacture and distribution of the
signature solution:
• The Mobile Phone Provider (MPP),
• The Signature Application Provider (SAP), and
• The Smart Card Provider (SCP).
The customer OWN , who is the owner of the mobile phone,
and the E-Commerce Company ECC are supposed to exe-
cute different contracts with MPP which plays the role of
mobile phone operator. We are concerned only with the
2These liabilities could be handled in the same way by
adding the e-commerce company and telecommunication op-
erator as additional parties.
3http://www.osgi.org/.
Figure 1: Communications with and within the sys-
tem, and the providing party for each component.
B2B contract between MPP , SAP and SCP here. We come
back in Section 2.4 to the legal consequences of including
OWN among the parties (specific regulations for consumer
protection). In the sequel, we shall use the word “party” for
MPP , SAP and SCP , and the word “user” for the end-users
of the system (ECC and OWN ).
Each component in the system is provided by one of the
parties. In our case, we assume that:
• The SigApp component is provided by SAP ,
• The Card component is provided by SCP , and
• The IO and OpSys components are provided by MPP .
2.3 Informal Agreement
The parties wish to define as precisely as possible the share
of liabilities between themselves in case of a claim from the
customer OWN .4 In practice, the customer will typically
address his claims to MPP because MPP is the only party
being in direct contact (and contractual relationship) with
him (both as a mobile phone provider and operator). MPP
will have to indemnify the customer if his claim is valid and
may in turn be indemnified by one (or several) of the other
parties depending on the type of the claim, the available log
files and the liability share defined in the agreement.
In the following, we assume that each document to be
signed is originally stamped by ECC and this stamp θ is
(i) unique, (ii) always included in the messages of a given
4In this paper we assume that the claims related to the use
of the signature solution come from the customer. Claims
from other users such as ECC would be handled in the same
way.
session and (iii) never modified. This stamp θ can be seen
as a session number which makes it easier to distinguish
messages pertaining to different signature sessions.
As an illustration, we consider two kinds of claims from
the customer, called DiffDoc and NotSigned, concerning the
signature of an alleged document D stamped θ:
(a) DiffDoc: the plaintiff OWN claims that he has been
presented a document D′ stamped θ different from the
alleged document D (stamped θ). In the case of a
purchase order, for example, D and D′ may differ with
respect to the quantity or price of the ordered items.
(b) NotSigned : the plaintiff OWN claims that he has never
been presented any document stamped θ.
We assume that the parties agree on the following informal
share of liabilities for these two types of claims:
(a) If OWN claims that he has been presented a document
D′ stamped θ different from the alleged document D
(stamped θ), then
a. SAP shall be liable if SigApp has forwarded to
OWN a document (stamped θ) different from the
document received from ECC .
b. Otherwise MPP shall be liable.
(b) If OWN claims that he has never been presented any
document stamped θ, then
a. If the smart card has wrongly validated a PIN for
document D stamped θ then SCP shall be liable.
b. Otherwise MPP shall be liable.5
We do not discuss the value or justifications for this in-
formal agreement here and just take it as an example of a
possible share of liabilities. It should be clear that this share
of liabilities is the result of a negotiation between the par-
ties, based on a combination of technical as well as business
and legal arguments, and it does not have to (and usually
cannot) be justified formally. The point is that the formal
framework should not impose any undue constraint on the
share of liabilities but should provide means for the parties
to express their wishes as precisely as possible.
2.4 Legal Context
Even though the intention of the parties is to settle lia-
bility issues in an amicable way, according to well-defined
rules, it is obvioulsy necessary to take into account the le-
gal context pursuant to computer systems. Any misconcep-
tion or overlooking of the legal constraints might lead to
contractual clauses that could be invalidated in court, thus
increasing rather than reducing legal risks. The two main
categories of legal constraints to be considered here concern
the two main phases of the process: (1) the formal defini-
tion of the share of liabilities among the parties and (2) the
analysis of the log files to establish these liabilities after the
facts. In the following, we examine these two categories of
legal constraints in turn.
5Because MPP plays the role of mobile phone operator, he
takes the risk in connection with the customer.
2.4.1 Liability Limitations
The first criterion to be taken into account to assess the
validity of contractual liability limitations and exemptions
is the qualification of the parties: specific protections are
provided by law to consumers.6 We first consider contracts
involving only professionals. Several cases of invalidity of
liability limitation7 clauses are defined by law. The first
obvious cases where the liability limitation would be consid-
ered null and void are when the party claiming the benefit
of the clause has committed acts of intentional fault, wil-
ful misrepresentation or gross negligence. Another case is
the situation where the limitation would undermine an es-
sential obligation of a party and would thus introduce an
unacceptable imbalance in the contract. This situation is
more difficult to assess though, and left to the appraisal of
the judge who may either accept the limitation, consider it
null, or even impose a different liability cap.8
As far as consumers are concerned, the law offers a num-
ber of protections which severely restrict the applicability
of liability limitation clauses. The philosophy of these rules
is that the consumer is in a weak position in the contrac-
tual relationship and legal guarantees should be provided to
maintain some form of balance in the contract. For example,
professionals must provide to their consumers “non confor-
mance” and “hidden defects” warranties in French law and
“implied warranty” (including “merchantability” and
“fitness”) in the American Uniform Commercial Code. Any
clause which would introduce a significant imbalance at the
prejudice of the consumer would be considered unconscionable.
Let us note that we have focused on contractual liabil-
ity here (liability which is defined in the contract itself): of
course, strict liability (when a defect in a product causes per-
sonal or property damages) will always apply with respect to
third parties (actors who are not parties to the contract). It
is still possible though for professionals to define contractual
rules specifying their respective share of indemnities due to
a victim (third party) by one of the parties.9
To conclude this subsection, let us mention other criteria
that need to be taken into account to refine the legal analy-
sis [13], in particular: the qualification of the contract itself
(product or service agreement), in case of a product agree-
ment, whether it is qualified as a purchase agreement or a
license agreement, the nature of the software (dedicated or
off-the-shelf software), the behaviour of the actors, etc.
6In French law, a party is considered as a consumer if he does
not execute the agreement in the context of a professional
activity, irrespective of the fact that he may have technical
skills in computers.
7In the sequel, we use the expression “liability limitation” as
a shorthand for “liability limitation or exemption”.
8The “Faurecia case” illustrates the different interpretations
of the notion of “essential contractual obligation”. The fi-
nal decision of the Cour de renvoi de la Cour de cassation
(November, 26th, 2008) has invalidated the decision of the
Cour de cassation (February 13th 2007) which had itself de-
clared the liability limitation clause invalid. The Cour de
renvoi has declared that the limitation of liability was not
in contradiction with the essential obligation of the software
provider (Oracle) because the customer (Faurecia) could get
a reasonable compensation.
9In European laws, the victim of a defect caused by a prod-
uct can sue any of the actors involved in the manufacturing
or distribution of the product.
2.4.2 Log Files as Evidence
The first observation concerning the contractual use of log
files is that digital evidence is now put on par with tradi-
tional written evidence. In addition, as far as legal facts are
concerned (as opposed to legal acts, such as contracts), the
general rule is that no constraint is imposed on the means
that can be used to provide evidence. As far as legal acts
are concerned, the rules depend on the amount of the trans-
action: for example no constraint is put on the means to
establish evidence for contracts of value less than one thou-
sand and five hundred Euros in France. The logs to be used
in the context of LISE concern the behaviour of software
components, which can be qualified as legal facts. Even
though they would also be used to establish the existence
and content of electronic contracts (as in our case study),
we can consider at this stage that their value would be un-
der the threshold imposed by law to require “written evi-
dence” or that the evidence provided by the log files would
be accepted as “written evidence” under the aforementioned
equivalence principle.
A potential obstacle to the use of log files in court could
be the principle according to which “no one can form for
himself his own evidence”. 10 It seems increasingly admitted
however, that this general principle allows exceptions for
evidence produced by computers [8]. As an illustration, the
printed list of an airline company showing the late arrival of
a traveller at the boarding desk was accepted as evidence by
the French Cour de cassation.11 Another condition for the
validity of log files as evidence is their fairness and legality.
For example, a letter or message recorded without the sender
or receiver knowing it cannot be used against them.12 As far
as the LISE project is concerned, attention should be paid
to the risk of recording personal data in log files: in certain
cases, such recording might be judged unfair and make it
impossible to use the log as evidence in court.
Generally speaking, to ensure the strength of the log based
evidence provisions in the agreement, it is recommended to
define precisely all the technical steps for the production of
the log files, their storage and the means used to ensure their
authenticity and integrity. Last but not least, as in the previ-
ous section, the cases where consumers are involved deserve
specific attention with respect to evidence: any contractual
clause limiting the possibilities of the consumer to defend his
case by providing useful evidence is likely to be considered
unconscionable in court.
2.4.3 International Law
To conclude this section, let us mention the issue of ap-
plicable law. Needless to say, the information technology
business is in essence international and, even though we have
focused on European laws in a first stage, more attention will
be paid in the future to broaden the scope of the legal study
and understand in which respect differences in laws and ju-
risdictions should be taken into account in the design of the
LISE framework. For example, liability limitation clauses
are more likely to be considered as valid by American courts
which put greater emphasis on contractual freedom [17].
10Nul ne peut se constituer de preuve a` soi-meˆme in French.
11Cass. civ. 1re, July 13th. 2004: Bull. civ. 2004, I, n◦ 207.
12Similarly for phone conversation recordings.
3. FORMAL SPECIFICATION OF LIABIL-
ITIES
The share of liabilities between the parties was expressed
in Section 2.3 in a traditional, informal way. Texts in natu-
ral language, even in simple “legal language”, often conceal
ambiguities and misleading representations. The situation is
even worse when such statements refer to mechanisms which
are as complex as software. Such ambiguities are sources of
legal uncertainties for the parties executing the contract.
The use of formal (mathematical) methods has long been
studied and put into practice in the computer science com-
munity to define the specification of software systems (their
expected behaviour) and to prove their correctness or to de-
tect errors in their implementations. For various reasons
however (both technical and economical), it remains diffi-
cult to apply formal methods at a large scale to prove the
correctness of a complete system.
In contrast with previous work on formal methods, our
goal here is not to apply them to the verification of the
system itself (the mobile phone solution in our case study)
but to define liabilities in case of malfunction and to build
an analysis tool to establish these liabilities from the log files
of the system.
It should be clear however, as stated in Section 1, that
our goal is not to provide a monolithic framework in which
all liabilities would have to be expressed. The method pro-
posed in the LISE project can be used at the discretion of
the parties involved and as much as necessary to express
the liabilities concerning the features or potential failures
deemed to represent the highest sources of risks for them.
In this section, we present successively the parameters
which are used to establish liabilities (Sections 3.1 and 3.2)
before introducing the liability function in Section 3.3. Let
us note that, in order to make the mathematical definitions
and the reasoning simpler, the notions used in this section
represent an abstraction of the real system. The link be-
tween this abstract view and the real system is described in
Section 4.
3.1 Trace Model
Following the informal description in Section 2, the sets
of components, parties and users are defined as follows:
Components = {Serv ,SigApp,Card , IO ,OpSys}
Parties = {MPP ,SAP ,SCP}
Users = {OWN ,ECC}
Θ is the set of stamps and C the set of communicating enti-
ties (components and users). O and M denote respectively
the set of communication operations and message contents.
The distinction between send and receive events allows us
to capture communication errors.13
C = Components ∪Users
O = {Send,Receive} M = List

Documents ∪
{Yes,No} ∪
PINCodes ∪
Signatures

We assume that signature sessions in traces are complete
and the type (document, response, PIN code, signature) of
each element composing a message is implicitly associated
with the element itself in order to avoid any ambiguity.
13This feature is not illustrated in this paper.
We denote by Traces the set of all traces, a trace T being
defined as as a function associating a stamp with a list of
items. Each item is defined by the communication operation
(Send or Receive), the sender, the receiver and the content
of the message:
T : Θ→ List(O × C × C ×M)
A first comment on the above definition is the fact that we
use a functional type (from stamps to lists of items) to rep-
resent traces. This choice makes the manipulation of traces
easier in the sequel because we are always interested in the
items corresponding to a given session. Other representa-
tions could have been chosen as well, such as lists of items
including the stamp information.
Note that we use the term “trace” here and keep the word
“log” to denote the actual information recorded by the sys-
tem. The correspondance between traces and logs is pre-
sented in Section 4.
3.2 Trace Properties
We present successively the two types of trace properties
used in this paper: error properties and claim properties.
3.2.1 Error Properties
The most important parameter to determine the alloca-
tion of liabilities is the nature of the errors which can be
detected in the log files of the system. Ideally, the frame-
work should be general enough to reflect the wishes of the
parties and to make it possible to explore the combinations
of errors in a systematic way. One possible way to realize
this exploration is to start with a specification of the key
properties to be satisfied by the system and derive the cases
which can lead to the negation of these properties.
Our goal being to analyse log files, we characterise the
expected properties of the system directly in terms of traces
(which are abstractions of logs). For example, the fact that
SigApp should send to IO the document D received from
Serv (and only this document) can be expressed as follows:14
∀D ∈ Documents,
(Receive,Serv ,SigApp, [D]) ∈ T (θ) ⇔
(Send,SigApp, IO , [D]) ∈ T (θ)
Note that all properties are implicitly parametrised by a
trace T and a stamp θ. In the sequel these parameters are
left implicit for the sake of readability.
In the scenario considered here, the systematic study15 of
the cases of violation of this property leads to the following
errors:
SigApp-Diff ≡
∃D,D′ ∈ Documents, D 6= D′ ∧
(Receive,Serv ,SigApp, [D]) ∈ T (θ) ∧
(Send,SigApp, IO , [D′]) ∈ T (θ)
14Note that we do not consider the ordering of Send and Re-
ceive trace items for the sake of conciseness. This ordering is
not necessary to express the liabilities presented in Section 2.
15Space considerations prevent us from presenting this sys-
tematic derivation here. It relies on a decomposition of the
negation of the properties into disjunctive normal form and
selective application of additional decomposition transfor-
mations for “non existence” properties.
SigApp-Not ≡
∃D ∈ Documents,
(Receive,Serv ,SigApp, [D]) ∈ T (θ) ∧
∀D′ ∈ Documents,
(Send,SigApp, IO , [D′]) /∈ T (θ)
SigApp-Un ≡
∃D ∈ Documents,
(Send,SigApp, IO , [D]) ∈ T (θ) ∧
∀D′ ∈ Documents,
(Receive,Serv ,SigApp, [D′]) /∈ T (θ)
The terms of this disjunction correspond to three typical
types of errors:
1. The first term defines a case where a message is sent
with content different from expected.
2. The second term is a case of expected message which
is not sent.
3. The third term is a case where an unexpected message
is sent.
Similarly, the negation of the property that Card returns a
signature only when it has received OWN ’s PIN code POWN
leads to several errors of the three aforementioned types,
from which we assume that only two are deemed relevant by
the parties. The first one, Card-WrongVal describes a case
where an approval and a signature are sent by Card even
though it has not received a right PIN code:
Card-WrongVal ≡
∃D ∈ Documents, ∃S ∈ Signatures,
(Send,Card ,SigApp, [Yes;D;S]) ∈ T (θ) ∧
(Receive,SigApp,Card , [D; POWN ]) /∈ T (θ)
The second one, Card-WrongInval, defines a case where Card
refuses to sign a document even though it has received the
correct PIN code POWN :
Card-WrongInval ≡
∃D ∈ Documents,
(Send,Card ,SigApp, [No;D]) ∈ T (θ) ∧
(Receive,SigApp,Card , [D; POWN ]) ∈ T (θ)
Needless to say, errors can also be defined directly based
on the parties’ understanding of the potential sources of fail-
ure of the system and their desire to handle specific cases.
The derivation method suggested here can be used when the
parties wish to take a more systematic approach to minimise
the risk of missing relevant errors.
Last but not least, the language used to express properties
for this case study is relatively simple as it does not account
for the ordering of items in traces. In general, richer logics
may be needed, for example to express temporal properties.
The choice of the language of properties does not have any
impact on the overall process but it may make some of the
technical steps, such as the log analysis (Section 4), more or
less difficult.
3.2.2 Claim Properties
Claim properties represent the “grounds for claims” of the
users: they correspond to failures of the system as experi-
enced by the users. In practice, such failures should cause
damages to the user for them to give rise to liabilities but
damages are left out the formal model. Claims can thus be
expressed, like errors, as properties on traces. We consider
two claim properties here, DiffDoc and NotSigned, which de-
fine the grounds for the claims introduced in Section 2.3:16
DiffDoc ≡
∃D,D′ ∈ Documents,∃S ∈ Signatures, D 6= D′ ∧
(Send,SigApp,Serv , [Yes;D;S]) ∈ T (θ) ∧
(Receive,SigApp, IO , [D′]) ∈ T (θ)
NotSigned ≡
∃D ∈ Documents, ∃S ∈ Signatures,
(Send,SigApp,Serv , [Yes;D;S]) ∈ T (θ) ∧
∀D′ ∈ Documents, (Receive,SigApp, IO , [D′]) 6∈ T (θ)
The first definition (DiffDoc) defines a claim correspond-
ing to a case where OWN has been presented a document
D′ with stamp θ (as indicated by (Receive,SigApp, IO , [D′])
different from the document D sent by the signature ap-
plication to the server (message [Yes;D;S]). The second
definition (NotSigned) defines a claim corresponding to a
case where the signature application has sent to the server a
message [Yes;D;S] indicating that OWN has signed a doc-
ument stamped θ when OWN has never been presented any
document stamped θ.
3.3 Liability Function
The formal specification of liabilities can be defined as a
function mapping a claim, a trace and a stamp onto a set of
parties:17
Liability : Claims× Traces×Θ→ P(Parties)
We use an intermediate function to define Liability: the
Check-Properties function which returns the subset of prop-
erties (errors and claims) holding for a session identified by
a trace and a stamp:
Check-Properties : Traces×Θ→ P(Properties)
Errors =
{
SigApp-Diff,SigApp-Un,SigApp-Not,
Card-WrongVal,Card-WrongInval
}
Claims = {DiffDoc,NotSigned}
Properties = Errors ∪ Claims
where Properties is the set of relevant trace properties, which,
in our case study, includes the sets Errors defined in Sec-
tion 3.2.1 and Claims defined in Section 3.2.2. Obviously,
other error and claim properties could be useful to define
other shares of liabilities. The actual implementation of
Check-Properties (Section 4) is based on the definitions of er-
rors and claims presented in Section 3.2.1 and Section 3.2.2.
Finally, the following function captures the share of lia-
16Note that, just as error properties, claim properties are
implicitly parametrised by a trace T and a stamp θ.
17P(S) denotes the powerset of S.
bilities introduced in Section 2.3:
Liability(C, T, θ) =
If C = DiffDoc then
If DiffDoc ∈ Check-Properties(T, θ)
Then If SigApp-Diff ∈ Check-Properties(T, θ)
Then {SAP}
Else {MPP}
Else ∅
If C = NotSigned then
If NotSigned ∈ Check-Properties(T, θ)
Then If Card-WrongVal ∈ Check-Properties(T, θ)
Then {SCP}
Else {MPP}
Else ∅
The two cases in Liability correspond to the two types of
claims considered in Section 2.3. For each type of claim, the
goal of the first test is to check the validity of the claim raised
by OWN . If OWN raises a claim which is not confirmed by
the trace then the result of Liability is the empty set because
no party has to be made liable for an unjustified claim. If
OWN claims to have been presented a document D′ dif-
ferent from the alleged document D and this claim is con-
firmed by the trace (DiffDoc ∈ Check-Properties(T, θ)) then
SAP is liable if SigApp has forwarded to OWN a document
(stamped θ) different from the document received from ECC
(SigApp-Diff ∈ Check-Properties(T, θ)); otherwise MPP is
liable. Similarly, if OWN ’s claim is that he has never been
presented any document stamped θ and this claim is con-
firmed by the trace (NotSigned ∈ Check-Properties(T, θ))
then SCP is liable if the smart card has wrongly validated a
PIN in session θ (Card-WrongVal ∈ Check-Properties(T, θ));
otherwise MPP is liable.
4. LOGARCHITECTUREANDANALYSER
The formal liability framework presented in the previous
section is useful in itself, because it makes it possible to de-
fine liabilities in a very precise way. Its role can be enhanced
however, if the actual system can be supported by facilities
to record the required log files (so that experts can be sure
to find all useful information after the facts) and if these
log files can be analysed automatically based on the liability
specifications. In this section, we sketch successively the log
infrastructure and analyser for our case study.
4.1 Log Architecture
The formal setting proposed in Section 3 defines traces
as lists of items corresponding to individual message ex-
changes between components. This choice is motivated by
its generality and the possibility to model a variety of con-
crete implementations. As mentioned in Section 2.1, the
implementation of our case study is based on OSGi, a Java
based environment for the design of applications made of
dynamically loadable collections of classes called bundles.
Our OSGi implementation consists of three bundles imple-
menting the following interfaces:
public interface SigAppIfc {
public String submitDocToUser(String doc);
}
public interface CardIfc {
public String sign(String doc , int pin);
}
public interface IOIfc {
public String askToUser(String doc);
}
Listing 1: OSGi interfaces of the system
Each bundle provides one service (through a Java public
method) which corresponds to a pair of request/answer mes-
sages in Figure 1. For example, the method submitDoc-
ToUser corresponds to the pair of messages 2 and 7-n, 9-
y-r or 9-y-w, depending on the outcome of the transaction.
The parameter of the method corresponds to the value Doc
passed in message 2 and the string returned as a result is
used to encode the different types of answers 7-n, 9-y-r and
9-y-w. Similarly, the method sign corresponds to the pair of
messages 7-y and 8-y-r or 8-y-w, and the method askToUser
to the pair 3 and 6-y or 6-n.
Table 1 shows the correspondence between the messages of
Figure 1 (which are equivalent to pairs of trace items defined
in Section 3) and the OSGi method calls and returns.
We have designed and developed an extension to the OSGi
framework, that we call LogOS (Log Over Services), which
records every service use. For each access to a service im-
plementation, the framework generates on the fly a proxy
that intercepts the call, logs the query of the call and for-
wards it to the implementation. LogOS is built on top of
Felix,18 an open-source implementation of the OSGi speci-
fications. The source code of LogOS, the LogOS patch for
Felix, and the implementation of the components presented
in this document are available on the INRIA forge.19
4.2 Analyser
The Liability function was expressed in terms of traces in
Section 3. Traces were defined in Subsection 3.1 as functions
mapping stamps to sequences of items, thus at a more ab-
stract level than the logs effectively recorded by LogOS. The
goal of the analyser is to implement the Liability function
specification of Section 3.3 based on the effective LogOS log
file format and the correspondence between traces and log
files. The four main phases of the analysis are the following:
1. The first phase is the identification of the part of the
log files which is relevant for the analysis. This part
obviously depends on the claim. In our case study,
the stamp θ can be used to identify the relevant signa-
ture session and thus to extract the useful parts of the
log. This phase of the analyser is made simpler here
because of the assumptions of stamps uniqueness and
integrity. Identifying a given session can be a more
complex task in general.
2. The second phase consists in transforming the relevant
parts of the logs into a trace. Table 1 describes this
transformation stage for our case study. For example,
let us consider a LogOS log file item recording the call
by the SigApp bundle to the askToUser service of the
IO bundle for a document doc1 and stamp 480031:20
480031;2009 -05 -05;08:34:12; SigApp;IO;IOImpl;
IOIfc;askToUser;doc1
;2009 -05 -05;08:34:23;"1234"
18http://felix.apache.org/
19http://gforge.inria.fr/frs/?group_id=2014
20Note that LogOS log file items include more information
than traces, such as the times and dates.
Generic trace items Message number Corresponding method
Components
(sender → receiver)
Message type
exchanged
according to
Figure 1 (call or return)
Serv → SigApp [Doc] 2 call to submitDocToUser
SigApp → Serv [No; Doc] 7-n return from submitDocToUser
SigApp → Serv [Yes; Doc; Signature] 9-y-r return from submitDocToUser
SigApp → Serv [No; Doc] 9-y-w return from submitDocToUser
SigApp → IO [Doc] 3 call to askToUser
IO → SigApp [Yes; Doc; PIN] 6-y return from askToUser
IO → SigApp [No; Doc] 6-n return from askToUser
SigApp → Card [Doc; PIN] 7-y call to sign
Card → SigApp [Yes; Doc; Signature] 8-y-r return from sign
Card → SigApp [No; Doc] 8-y-w return from sign
Table 1: Relation between trace items, messages and methods
Following Table 1, this log item can be transformed
into the following trace items for stamp 480031:21
(Send,SigApp, IO , [doc1]);
(Receive,SigApp, IO , [doc1])
(Send, IO ,SigApp, [Yes; doc1; 1234]);
(Receive, IO ,SigApp, [Yes; doc1; 1234])

3. The third phase is the application of Check-Properties
to check the validity of the claim and find the errors
occurring in the trace. Again, this phase is made easier
by the fact that the properties needed to express the
share of liabilities considered here are fairly simple. All
these properties (Errors in Section 3.2.1 and Claims in
Section 3.2.2) are expressed as the presence or absence
of certain items in the trace, which can be implemented
by systematic searches in the trace constructed from
the log files.22
4. The fourth phase is the exploitation of the result of the
Check-Properties function to compute Liability. This
phase is straightforward since it amounts to the imple-
mentation of the simple tests specified in the definition
of Liability in Section 3.3.
The simple four phases structure sketched here obviously
needs to be optimized in order to avoid the search for all
properties (claims and errors) in the trace: only the claim
raised by OWN and the errors useful for this claim23 need
to be searched in the trace. Check-Properties is thus not im-
plemented as such, but split into specific functions searching
for specific properties.
5. RELATEDWORK
The significance of liability, warranty and accountability
and their potential impact on software quality have already
been emphasized by computer scientists as well as lawyers
([2, 5, 27, 28]). However we are not aware of previous work
on the application of formal methods to the definition of
21As stated above, the duplication of send and receive events
is useful in general to detect communication errors. This fea-
ture is not illustrated here though, because communication
errors have not been used to define the share of liabilities.
22Note that, in contrast with the use of formal modals for
program verification, we only need to check these properties
on a given trace here, rather than for all possible execution
traces, and this trace is obviously finite.
23For example, only the error SigApp-Diff is useful to com-
pute Liability for the claim DiffDoc.
software liability. Earlier work on the specification of con-
tracts mostly deal with obligations in a general sense ([9,
11, 24]), with specific types of contracts such as commercial
contracts or privacy rules ([2, 16, 22]) or with the respon-
sibility of agents in multi-agent systems ([12]) but do not
address liabilities related to software errors. It should be
clear however that several connected areas share part of our
objectives and provide useful hints and results:
• Software dependability [4, 18, 23] is also concerned
with failure analysis (using, for example, fault trees
or FMECA analysis processes) but focuses on fault
prevention, tolerance and removal rather than on the
specification of liabilities.
• Model based diagnosis ([7, 19, 23, 35]) provides tech-
niques for fault analysis and diagnosability based on
observability properties. Diagnosis can be carried out
either off-line or on-line24 with different cost and time
constraints. Faults are generally represented as sin-
gle events rather than as logical properties in our ap-
proach. Again, the objective of model based diagnosis
is to detect faults and analyze them in order to take
appropriate measures rather than to determine the li-
able parties after a failure has occurred and damages
have been caused.
• Intrusion detection ([14]) systems also aim at detecting
unexpected behaviours but they are targeted towards
security attacks rather than faults. They are generally
classified into two categories: the anomaly detection
and the misuse detection approaches, the first one be-
ing based on a model of the correct behaviour of the
system and the second one on typical attack patterns.
As stated in the next section, our framework can ac-
comodate both negative properties (as shown in this
paper) and positive properties (correct behaviours). In
contrast with intrusion detection however, we do not
have any“real time”constraint here and accuracy is far
more significant than efficiency for liability analysis.
• Forensics ([3, 21, 26]) and digital evidence ([10, 32, 33,
34]) share with LISE the objective to analyse digital
information in a legal setting. However the contribu-
tions in these areas are generally targeted towards se-
curity attacks or computer crime investigations rather
than the identification of liable parties in a software
24“Off-board”or “on-board” for embedded systems.
contract. Technically speaking, a significant impact is
the fact that, in our setting, the search in the logs is
driven by pre-defined properties (errors and claims).
• Service Level Agreements also define contractual pro-
visions but generally focus on Quality of Service rather
than functional requirements and do not put emphasis
on formal specifications. A notable exception is the
SLAng language [30] which is endowed with a formal
semantics and can be used to specify a variety of ser-
vices such as Application Service Provision, Internet
Service Provision or Storage Service Provision. In ad-
dition, the monitorability and monitoring of SLAng
services have been considered both from the formal
and practical point of view [31, 25].
Needless to say, each of the above areas are useful sources of
inspiration for the LISE project, but we believe that none
of them, because of their different objectives, provides the
answer to the key problem addressed in this paper, namely
the formal specification and instrumentation of liability.
6. CONCLUSION
First, we should stress that the set of methods and tools
provided by the LISE framework can be used in an incremen-
tal way, depending on the wishes of the parties, the economic
stakes and the timing constraints for drafting the contract:
1. The first level is a systematic (but informal) definition
of liabilities in the style of Section 2.3.
2. The second level is the formal definition of liabilities as
presented in Section 3.3. This formal definition itself
can be more or less detailed and encompass only a part
of the liability rules defined informally. In addition, it
does not require a complete specification of the soft-
ware but only the properties relevant for the targeted
liability rules.
3. The third level is the implementation of a log infras-
tructure (as shown in Section 4.1) or the enhancement
of existing logging facilities to ensure that all the infor-
mation required to establish liabilities will be available
if a claim is raised. Another option is to check that
it will be possible to extract the required information
from regular files if needed.
4. The fourth level is the implementation of a log analyser
(as shown in Section 4.2) to assist human experts in
the otherwise tedious and error-prone log inspection.
5. A fifth level, not presented here, would be the verifi-
cation of the correctness of the log analyser with re-
spect to the formal definition of liabilities (considering
the correspondence between log files and traces). This
level would bring an additional guarantee about the
validity of the results produced by the system.
Each of these levels contributes to reducing further the un-
certainties with respect to liabilities and the parties can de-
cide to choose the level commensurate with the risks involved
with potential failures of the system.
The notions of trace and property have been presented
in a somewhat simplified way in this paper. It may be the
case that not all the relevant information is included in the
log files of the system. For example, in our case study, the
fact that the customer OWN has declared the theft of his
mobile phone or has signed an acknowledgement receipt for
a product sent by the E-Commerce Company can be useful
information to analyse the situation (depending on the lia-
bility rules decided by the parties). Traces can thus be more
than abstract versions of the log files and include other types
of actions from all the actors involved. Also, we have defined
Properties as Errors∪Claims here. In general, it can be use-
ful to use other types of properties to define liabilities (for
example the fact that OWN has answered “yes” to the sig-
nature request sent by SigApp here). These properties can
be included into Properties without any impact on the rest
of the process.
As far as the methodology is concerned, we are working on
an iterative process for the elaboration of the formal specifi-
cation of liabilities involving interactions with the parties to
discover oversights or missing errors and to take into account
logging constraints. Logging constraints are typically related
to implementation issues (e.g. performance penalties or log
distribution), security requirements or privacy issues ([1]).
For example, in our case study, logging critical data such as
PIN codes outside the smart card would not be acceptable,
thus requiring an iteration step to define an equivalent (or
approximated) definition of liability that could be reflected
in the logs. In addition it is necessary to take into account
observability issues: previous work on model based diagno-
sis and diagnosability ([7, 19, 23, 35]) will prove useful to
this respect.
In general, liabilities will be expressed by a combination of
informal and formal means, both of which being integrated
in the legal agreement. We are working on a framework
allowing the parties to feed their contract with clauses auto-
matically generated from the formal specifications of liability
with seamless integration with the rest of the contract. The
final objective is to allow contract drafters to manipulate
statements either in natural language or in formal language
while maintaining the links between the two parts and the
consistency of the whole document. This extension is based
on our previous work on the links between mathematical
texts and natural language explanations ([15]).
In terms of implementation of the log infrastructure, one
distinguishing feature of the case study considered here is the
possibility to manage the log in a centralised way. Obviously,
this may not be the case in many situations, which will add
the extra difficulty to define correspondences (or causality
relationships) between items in different logs ([6, 35]). Last
but not least, we are currently working on two other key
issues related to log files which have not been discussed here:
their optimisation in terms of storage (compaction, retention
delay, etc.) using an index-based factorization method and
techniques to ensure their authenticity and integrity ([1, 20,
29]) including trusted serialization of log items.
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